A Crash Course in OpenCTI

By: Coleman Kane DeepSeas

What is OpenCTI?

https://filigran.io/solutions/products/opencti-threat-intelligence/

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) Database

- Emphasis on automation, visualization, and standards compliance
- STIX 2.1 internal representation (JSON)
- TAXII server/client support
- Modern tech stack: React/Node.js, ElasticSearch, RabbitMQ
- API-first design via Low-level GraphQL API
- Fully asynchronous UI
- High-level API library in Python
- Modular plug-in extensibility through the "connectors" ecosystem
- Data scraping automation
- Case and Knowledge management features



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Filigran: the Company Supporting OpenCTI

Based in France (Paris)

Committed to Open Source and Open Standards (e.g. STIX, TAXII, ATT&CK) "Community Edition" open-sourced under Apache License 2.0 "Enterprise Edition" open-sourced under a proprietary non-commercial license Other projects: OpenCrisis, OpenEx (simulation/exercises), OpenRiskManager

STIX documentation: https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/intro

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UI Overview: Entity

entity

Marking definition



UI Overview: Knowledge Graphs

Graph



STIX Data Model

Analysis: Document CTI Reports & Build Products

Analyses

Reports: Threat Intel reports, actor analysis, blog posts, etc.

Groupings: Less formal groupings - reports, but without the narrative content

Malware analyses: Reports focusing on Malware, and adhering to the "malware-analysis" STIX 2.1 entity

Notes: Global view of any notes in the platform

External References: Global view of all external reference links in the platform

Cases: Manage related work

🖆 Cases

Incident Response: Manage tasks and context that will occur during incident response

RFI: Dedicated tasking/context container for non-Incident requests to Intel team

Request for Takedown: Similar to RFI/IR, but specific for externally-directed takedown requests

Tasks: Global view of all tasks

Feedback: Global view of all user feedback

Events: Temporal Info and Related Analysis

E Events

Incidents: Serious events, typically that necessitated incident response

Sightings: Location, temporal, and frequency information related to an observation

Observed Data: Temporal information related to an observation

Observations: Collected Data and Detections

Observations

Observables: Data points observed when investigating malicious activity

Artifacts: Unstructured data paired with structured metadata representing files/malware/images/memory/etc. collected during analysis

Indicators: Detection-suitable data points. STIX 2.1 defines these to be derived from Observables, and also represent complex signature data (Yara, Suricata, Sigma, etc.)

Infrastructures: Specialized container documenting infrastructure analysis

Observables vs. Indicators

A lot of confusion due to varying definitions across orgs

Common to see "indicator" refer to both element types

- Observable: Information I've seen during an analysis or investigation
- Indicator: Of what I've seen, the subset and/or combination that would be indicative of future malicious activity

STIX 2.1 has a formal definition of both, and OpenCTI adheres to that standard

- <u>https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/examples/sighting-of-an-indicator</u>
- <u>https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/examples/sighting-of-observed-data</u>

Threats: Individual and Group Operations

, Threats

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Threat Actors: Identifiable Groups or individuals that operate intrusion sets for cyber operations

Intrusion Sets: Activity sets that represent consistent means, motivations, and targeting. Tying to actual threat actors may take time. Most published "groups" in CTI fit into this category

Campaigns: Series of attempts carried out by an intrusion set to achieve an objective. Typically incorporates a time-bound and distinct tooling & TTPs. Similar to Observables/Indicators, Threats adhere to the STIX 2.1 standard definitions, which may often differ from how these terms may be used in a lot of orgs.



https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/examples/defining-campaign-ta-is

Arsenal: Adversary Toolbox

Malware: Types of malware known to be used by adversaries.

Channels: Online locations where adversaries may disseminate information

Tools: Tools used by the adversary - typically tools that aren't inherently malware (LOLbins, etc.)

Vulnerabilities: Vuln data that can be populated from national CVE registry.

Arsenal

Techniques: Operations and Methods

🛠 Techniques

Attack Pattern: Attack patterns and adversary techniques - includes (but not limited to) MITRE ATT&CK

Narratives: Specific to disinfo - concepts and messaging being propagated for persuasion

Courses of Action: Defender-side techniques that can be used for prevention and mitigation

Data sources: Data sources available from sensors/logs/collection

Data components: Data within a source relevant to detecting a particular technique

Entities & Locations: Who, When, & Where

Entities♀ Locations

Entities: Organizations, Sectors, Events (non-activity), Systems, Individuals - often used for targeting and attribution

Locations: Geographical information: Region, Country, City, Area, Position

Importing Document Data

PDF Import

Stately Taurus Targets the Philippines As Tensions Flare in the South Pacific

Unit 42

This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)

Executive Summary

Tensions between China and the Philippines have risen sharply over the past several months. In early August, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel fired its water cannon at a Philippine vessel that was performing a resupply mission to the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands. Since then, the Philippines has announced joint patrols with the United States, and naval exercises with Australia. It has been reported that the Philippine Coast Guard has both terminated a hotline established with their Chinese counterparts and acted to remove Chinese barriers placed near the disputed Scarborough Shoal.

Coinciding with these real-world events, Unit 42 researchers observed three Stately Taurus campaigns during the month of August. These campaigns are assessed to have targeted entities in the South Pacific including the Philippines government. The campaigns leveraged legitimate software including Solid PDF Creator and SmadavProtect (an Indonesian-based antivirus solution) to sideload malicious files. Threat authors also creatively configured the malware to impersonate legitimate Microsoft traffic for command and control (C2) connections.





Stately Taurus Targets the Philippines As Tensions Flare in the South Pacific.pdf admin

Analyst Workbench

When ready for import, click here

Entities are matched to existing names & aliases in the database

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Repo

Extension Framework (Connectors)

Extend OpenCTI With Connectors

Five types

- Internal Import File: Translate an uploaded file into STIX and import it (via workbench)
- Internal Export File: Translate selected STIX data from OpenCTI into a downloadable file
- External Import: From an external online source, convert source data to STIX and import
- Enrichment: Perform automated analysis on STIX data in the database, and add/delete context on it
- Stream: Operate continuously on data entering OpenCTI to feed it to external sources, or vice-versa

Deployed as Python containers

Uses the same Python API as Python scripts, with some additional features and RabbitMQ access

Templates in GitHub repository so new connectors can be written with some direction

Connectors: <u>https://github.com/OpenCTI-Platform/connectors</u> Python API: <u>https://github.com/OpenCTI-Platform/client-python</u>

Easy OSINT Collection Instance

Identified all "free" and "public" plugins

Created a docker-compose.yml to deploy them all

Made a Terraform recipe to quickly deploy to AWS

My Docker fork (branch tf-main): <u>https://github.com/ckane/opencti-docker/tree/tf-main</u> OpenCTI "vanilla" docker: <u>https://github.com/OpenCTI-Platform/docker</u>

Terraform recipe (branch ckane-dockers): https://github.com/ckane/opencti-terraform/tree/ckane-dockers

Quick Start - Test on Local System Using Docker

1) Download ckane's opencti-docker git clone -b tf-main <u>https://github.com/ckane/opencti-docker.git</u> cd opencti-docker # 2) Edit .env and fill in blanks cp .env.sample .env vim .env # Run 'uuidgen -r' multiple times to generate new UUID for each # blank *_ID= line in .env while grep _ID=\$.env > /dev/null; do new_uuid="\${uuidgen -r}" sed -i "0,/_ID=\\$/{s/_ID=\\$/_ID=\${new_uuid}}" .env done

3) Generate login email, password, API token sed -i "s/^OPENCTI_ADMIN_EMAIL=.*\$/OPENCTI_ADMIN_EMAIL=<u>vou@vou.com</u>/" .env sed -i "s/^OPENCTI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=.*\$/OPENCTI_ADMIN_PASSWORD=MemorizedSecret/" .env sed -i "s/^OPENCTI_ADMIN_TOKEN=.*\$/OPENCTI_ADMIN_TOKEN=\$(uuidgen -r)/" .env

4) Start docker
docker-compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d

OpenCTI will come up listening on HTTP port 8080 on localhost

Other Features

UI Overview: Yara Rule

Pattern type - admin can add more types

Rule code - editable in browser UI or via API

Control

switch

"Detection"



Q Search...

UI Overview: Advanced GraphQL Query



Thanks! Any Questions?

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